I. Introduction
A popular wisdom in the burgeoning literature on terrorism focuses on the economic motivations of terrorists. "We fight against poverty," President George W.
Bush explained in Monterrey Mexico on March 23, 2002, "because hope is an answer to terror." Stern (2003) also draws a direction connection between poverty and terrorism.
While poverty is an attractive answer to the question of "why terrorism?", the data do not lend much support for it. Macroeconomic shifts generally fail to map on to changes in terrorist activity. For example, in the late 1990s and 2000, when terrorism reached new heights against Israeli citizens, the typical Palestinian was reporting a rosier economic forecast and unemployment was declining. Using a longer time-series, Berrebi (2003) finds little correlation between economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the number of terrorist incidents against Israel. An even more perplexing problem for the poverty thesis arises on the micro-level. Several studies of individuals have failed to find any direct connection between education, poverty, and the propensity to participate in terrorism (Russell and Miller, 1983; Taylor, 1988; Hudson, 1999; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Berrebi, 2003 , Atran, 2003 . If anything, those who participate in terrorism tend to come from the ranks of the better off in society.
Those who claim a connection between poverty and terrorism could respond that at least on the micro level, well-to-do citizens become terrorists out of public spiritedness for their impoverished fellow citizens, and they are chosen by organizations to perform these tasks due to their reliability and skill. Consider the anecdotal findings of Nasra Hassan (2001) , for example. She interviewed 250 militants and their associates involved in the Palestinian cause from 1996-99. One Hamas leader told her, "Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent [on suicide missions] . It is difficult to select only a few." And whom did they choose from these hordes? She reports that, "None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs." She also found, "two were the sons of millionaires." Thus a "Robin Hood" connection might be made linking poverty to terrorism. Individuals can become terrorists because of poverty in their country, even if they are themselves not impoverished.
Moreover, the fact that terrorist organizations actively screen and recruit members, perhaps choosing the elite from a long queue of applicants, may mask the role that individuals' personal economic circumstances play in the supply of terrorists (see Bueno de Mesquita, 2003) . That is, poverty may cause more individuals to want to supply their services to be terrorists, but the organizations may not select them. If this is the case, then the available micro evidence, which reflects both supply and demand factors, may paint a misleading picture of the role of economic factors on the supply of terrorists.
Cross-national studies of terrorism have the potential to identify the effect of national economic conditions on terrorism, reflecting both the role of supply-side factors (i.e., determinants of who volunteers) and demand-side factors (i.e., terrorist organizations recruiting and screening participants). These studies are most relevant to the question of how the equilibrium differs under different economic conditions. A small literature has examined the correlates of participation in terrorism at the national level, either using the country of origin of the terrorists (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003) or the country where the event occurred (Piazza, 2003) as the unit of observation. Both types of studies have found little correlation between economic factors, such as GDP per capita or GDP growth, and the incidence of terrorism. Similarly, Abadie (2004) examines the effect of terrorism risk from insurance ratings, including both domestic and international terrorism. He finds that a country's income per capital is unrelated to terrorism risk, while political rights have a non-monotonic relationship with terrorism risk. Countries with a high level of political rights or authoritarian rule had the lowest risk of terrorism in his data. Burgoon (2006) finds that welfare spending relative to GDP is inversely related to the number of terrorist incidents occurring in a cross-section of countries and in a panel of countries over time. His model also controls for government capacity, however, which is a composite measure that largely reflects GDP per capita. Government capacity is positively related to the number of terrorist incidents. Trade openness is unrelated to the number of terrorist incidents. Li and Schaub (2004) estimate a similar model and control for economic development. They interpret their estimates as indicting that economic development discourages terrorism, but they also control for government capabilities, which has a sizable positive impact on terrorism that likely offsets their claimed negative effect of economic development. Their model is also hard to interpret because they control for lagged terrorist incidents. Because most of the variability in income is cross sectional and long lasting, controlling for lagged incidents clouds the interpretation of income on terrorist incidents.
In this paper, we extend the previous literature by linking both the country of origin and the target country of the terrorist event. As Lenin often reminded those who briefed him on revolutionary affairs, the key pair of questions to ask is: "Kto kogo?", or "Who to whom?" Relying on our coding of the US State Department's data on international terrorism, and a new dataset on suicide attacks, we look not only at the attacker, but also at the target. We find that controlling for political regime, there is little economic foundation for terrorist origins (the kto). Rather, the economic story for terrorism is in the characteristics of the target (the kogo). The data suggest that the origins of terrorism are in countries that suffer from political oppression; the targets are countries that enjoy a measure of economic success.
II. Datasets and Description of Terrorist Events

A. The Dataset on International Terrorist Incidents
We rely on two distinct datasets. The first is on international terrorism. The State Department further restricts its statistical efforts toward the identification of "international terrorism," which means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
Yet international terrorism is a tricky concept to define. The State Department
Global Terrorism report recognizes some of these problems. For example, in its early years of reporting, Palestinians were defined as stateless people, and therefore their attacks on other Palestinians in the territories occupied by Israel were counted as international terrorism; but in later years, consistent with criteria for other intra-ethnic violence, these events were re-coded as domestic terrorism, and were therefore retroactively deleted from the earlier annual reports.
There are several additional coding problems that are not acknowledged.
Colombia since 1997 has had the second highest exposure to international terrorism according the State Department data. However, some of these events appear from their description in the State Department files as tactics to control the drug traffic rather than "politically motivated violence" to "influence an audience." A different problem arises with India, the country with the largest number of incidents since 1997. 
B. Suicide Attack Dataset
The second dataset is exclusively on suicide attacks since 1980. A suicide attack is a tactic in an insurgency in which the perpetrator of the attack will die with a probability of one if the attack is a success (Berman and Laitin, 2005) . In this paper, to produce a broad set of cases that qualify as suicide attacks, we merge two suicide datasets. The first is from Pape (2003, 357-60) . The second is from the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. In the combined dataset, there are 236 recorded suicide attacks in eleven countries. For purposes of our "Kto, kogo?" questions the two datasets focus on somewhat different contexts, but nonetheless complement each other. By definition, the dataset on international terrorism will have an individual or group (the "who") from one political unit attacking a target (the "whom") from another political unit. By contrast, in the suicide attack dataset nearly all (187 out of 210) events involve a perpetrator and target from the same country. In these cases, the relevant differences are in the ethnicity or religion of the attackers as compared to the targets.
C. Brief Description of Events
Of the 781 terrorist events and the 236 suicide attacks in the two datasets, several patterns are worth noting (see Table 2 ). First, as shown in row 1, terrorism and suicide attacks are both mainly the product of organizational strategy rather than the efforts of individual zealots or madmen. 11 Therefore, explanations for terrorism cannot be adequate without an account of why leaders in a hierarchy would send their cadres on such missions. Organizations staff terrorist events, and seek to accomplish their goals through the use of high-quality cadres, who would be more reliable to carry out the planned missions than less skilled cadres. They are able to recruit even suicide missionaries successfully, and here the explanation is consistent with Emile Durkheim's classic study of suicide, in religious organizations and armies, that is in places where "social integration is too strong." The result is what Durkheim calls "altruistic" suicide. People prone to suicide are a constant across societies. Suicide rates vary, however, based on both a social condition of low network solidarity (anomic suicide) and one of high network solidarity (altruistic suicide). In this latter case, with socially dense networks, all too many volunteer to give up their lives for the glory of their organizations.
Third, as indicated on row 5, the probability that the perpetrator and target will be from different religious groups is clearly different for international terrorism than it is for suicide bombing. Taking a rough estimate of the world population for the world's four major religions (Muslim, Christian, Hindu and Buddhist) and a single category of Other (that includes nearly all Chinese and all Jews), the probability that any two randomly selected individuals in the world (with replacement) will be from different religions is 77.2%. Therefore, other things equal, international terrorism is only trivially more likely to involve intra-religious parties than if it were randomly determined throughout the world.
13 By contrast --but consistent with Berman and Laitin (2005) --suicide attacks are more likely to be inter-religious than would be expected from random selection of pairs from the world's population. Because suicide attacks in our data set often involve people from the same country, arguably a better benchmark might be to compute the chance of two randomly selected people within each country being from different religions. In the average country in the world, 27.3% of people are from different religions, so suicide attacks are far more likely to involve parties from different religions than would be expected from randomness. This does not mean, however, that religious differences are necessarily a motivation for suicide attacks.
Finally, as illustrated on row 6, the origin countries for terrorism and suicide attacks are different, with only Israel in the top five of both datasets. The suicide origin countries are richer. The mean log GDP per capita for the five leading terrorist sources in 1980 was 7.56; and for the five leading suicide sources, it was 8.40. 14 An examination of the top five origin countries suggest a great amount of concentration and low level of diffusion to other insurgencies of these technologies of warfare. The top five origin countries account for 57% of the total cases in the terrorist dataset; they account for 96% of the cases in the suicide dataset.
As to questions of "Kto, kogo?", in the international terrorism dataset, as noted earlier, in less than half of the cases (44%) is the country of origin, the place of the attack, and the citizenship of the target the same. In less than half of the events as well, the citizenship of the perpetrator and that of the target are the same.
Suicide attacks have a different profile, at least in part because the international terrorist dataset purposefully excludes domestic terrorism. For the suicide attacks, in a full 90% of the cases, the country of the attack, the country of the attacker, and the country of the victims are the same. The perpetrators and the targets were of the same country in 90% of the suicide events; the target and the country of attack were the same in 92% of the events; and the perpetrator performed the suicide mission in his or her own country in 95% of the cases.
III. Country-Level Analyses
In this section we analyze terrorism using the country of origin of the perpetrator, country of the target, or the country where the event took place as the unit of observation.
This could be thought of providing an analysis of the margins of the matrix describing the 14 . Compare this to 7.0 for the mean logged GDP per capita in 1985 dollars (lagged by one year) for all countries that had a civil war onset. See Fearon and Laitin, replication dataset.
events: who, to whom and where, or as Lenin might ask, Kto? Kogo? Gde? We defer an analysis of the joint probabilities -who, to whom -to section IV.
As an initial way to summarize the characteristics of the countries of those involved in terrorism, Table 3 assigns country-level attributes to each terrorist incident, and computes the average across incidents, using the country of origin, country of the primary target, or country where the event occurred to match on the country attributes.
For example, in column (2) we merged on data based on the country of origin, and computed the mean across incidents. This amounts to a weighted average of characteristics --such as GDP per capita, illiteracy, ethnic fractionalization, and political and civil rights --across countries, where the weights are the number of international terrorist incidents attributed to citizens of each country. Column (3) presents the same statistics excluding incidents originating in India and Colombia from the sample.
Column (4) presents results based on the target country of the attack, and column (5) based on the country where the attack occurred. For a point of reference, column (1) presents the weighted mean of the country attributes, using as weights the population of the country.
To more easily spot the discrepancies between terrorists and the world population, Figure 1 presents a "radar chart" depicting the ratio of the mean of the indicated variable for terrorists based on their country of origin and the weighted-average person in the world. Figure 2 presents the analogous ratio of the target country to the weightedaverage world population. If the terrorists come from countries that are on average no different than the world population, the ratio would be one and the point would lie on the unit circle in Figure 1 . If the country characteristics differ between the terrorists' home and the world population, then the ratio will exceed one or be less than one. These radar plots are just meant to be descriptive: they clearly have analytical problems. For example, for some variables a ratio of 1.2 may indicate a more significant divergence than a ratio of 2.4 for other variables. More importantly, the charts and table break down the population on an endogenous variable -by conditioning on whether the individual was a terrorist, rather than on the country characteristic -so in a real sense these charts are equivalent to sampling on the dependent variable. Nevertheless, they still provide a vivid description of how terrorists differ from the world population, or of how the targets of terrorism differ from the world population, in terms of country-level characteristics.
Compared to the world population, the results indicate that terrorists are more likely to come from low-income countries with low GDP growth (from 1990 to 2000).
The pattern is not monotonic in terms of income, however, as terrorists are over represented among the poorest quartile of countries and the third quartile of countries.
15
The terrorists are also more likely to come from countries' characterized by anocracy and political instability. 16 Insofar as targets are concerned, the targeted individuals tend to live in wealthier countries that are more stable, less anocratic, and more democratic than the average person in the world. As for country of occurrence, it is a profile far closer to that of the perpetrator's country -poor, high illiteracy, and high infant mortality. In many cases (Kashmir and Jammu, Bosnia, Kosovo, West Bank and Gaza, and Afghanistan), the attacks occur against armies or army installations of what are perceived to be foreign or 15 The quartile GDP per capita cutoffs were not weighted by population. 16 Based on the coding of Fearon and Laitin (2003) , using the Polity IV dataset, instability is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country had a three-or-greater change on the regime index in any of the three years prior to the country-year in question. Anocracy is another dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the regime index for that year is between a -5 and a +5, on an index that spans from -10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy).
"occupying" powers. When in future work the attacks against American installations in Iraq in 2003 are analyzed, this pattern will be reinforced. countries with a lower level of civil liberties have a higher participation rate in terrorism, on average. Thus, in contrast to the radar plots, low civil liberties are associated with greater participation in terrorism, while economic factors are unrelated. If one is looking for country characteristics that are causal determinants of terrorism, we think the Table 5 results are more relevant, although it is of course possible that the associations revealed in the table do not represent causal relationships.
When the results are tabulated by the target country's characteristics, a different picture emerges. In column (2) we see that countries with higher GDP per capita are more likely to be the target of terrorism (on a per capita basis), and civil liberties in the target country do not bear a monotonic relationship with terrorism. In terms of political rights, the contrast is even greater: countries that afford a low level of political rights are more likely to be the springboards of terrorism and less likely to be the targets of terrorism. A country's terrain, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, religious fractionalization, and political stability are all unrelated to the incidence of terrorism per capita, either as a target or origin.
The right-hand part of Table 5 shows as well that fast growing, stable countries are more likely to be the origin and target of suicide attacks.
The influence of Sri Lanka, a majority Buddhist country, is again evidence on the results by religion. Similarly the influence of Israel, a majority Jewish country (classified here in Mixed/Other), has a high proportion of both origin and target. But as with Sri Lanka, the perpetrators are not of the same religion as the majority in the country.
Religious fractionalization in a country, however, is unrelated to the incidence of suicide attacks, although, as noted, a high proportion of the suicide attacks involve perpetrators and victims from different religions.
Regression Models
We extended the bivariate comparisons in Table 5 by estimating a series of Negative Binomial regression models, simultaneously controlling for several possible determinants of terrorism. A sampling of our results is reported in Table 6 . The dependent variable is the number of international terrorist events traceable to each country. The unit of observation is the country of origin in columns 1-2, the target country in columns 3-4, and the country where the event took place in columns 5-6. The explanatory variables in the first model are just log GDP per capita and log population; in the second model we also include per capita GDP growth, the Freedom House Index of Civil Liberties, and the percent of the population belonging to each of the world's four largest religions. The explanatory variables correspond to the country that defines the unit of observation. We selected the variables shown in the table because, for the most part, other variables that we included in the model were insignificant, or because there is particular interest in the relationship between these variables and terrorism. (We did not estimate corresponding models for suicide attacks because so few countries were involved in these attacks.)
The results have no surprises compared to the bivariate comparisons in Table 5 .
Quite sensibly, larger countries (in terms of population) are associated with more terrorism, at the origin, target, and place unit of analysis. At either the origin or place-ofoccurrence levels, GDP per capita is insignificantly related to terrorism, but it is positively related to terrorism at the target-country level. A paucity of civil liberties, by contrast, is associated with more terrorism at the origin country and at the country where the event is perpetrated, but not at the target country level. In this sense, the results suggest that the genesis of terrorism involves political factors, while the targets are more economic in nature. The disparate findings based on country of origin and target country illustrate the importance of aggregating separately by origin and target.
We cannot reject that the shares affiliated with the various religions jointly have no effect on terrorism, at any of the levels of analyses. No religion appears to have a monopoly on terrorism; countries with very different religious faiths have all experienced terrorism, as targets, origins and hosts.
An econometric issue of relevance for the estimates in Table 5 is whether the Negative Binomial specification is appropriate. In particular, with so many countries having a value of zero for the number of terrorist attacks (either in the origin or target equation), one could wonder whether the Negative Binomial specification fits the data
well. An alternative specification is the zero-inflated negative binomial model, which allows for a different process to determine countries with a zero value of the dependent variable. Indeed, a Vuong test of the Negative Binomial versus the more general zeroinflated negative binomial model raises questions about the specification: the p-value for the test is 0.13 in column 1 and .002 in column 2. It is reassuring, however, that if we dichotomize the dependent variable by setting it equal to one if the country was an origin of international terrorism and zero if not, and then estimate a logit model, our main conclusions regarding income and income growth are unaffected. In particular, if we estimate such a model using the explanatory variables in column 2 of Table 5 , both GDP per capita and GDP growth have statistically insignificant and small effects. The civil liberties variable, however, is also statistically insignificant in this logit specification.
IV. Kto, Kogo?: Characteristics of Origins and Targets
Our last set of analyses involves the matrix of who to whom: that is, we model the cross tabulation of the origins and targets of terrorism. Each country is a potential origin country for perpetrators who can attack any country in the world. Because we have a maximum of 159 countries in our sample, and, without further structure, the full Kto, kogo? analysis would involve a matrix with 159x159 = 25,122 cells, most of which would be empty, we need to simplify the analysis. Here we focus on two important dimensions of origin and target countries: their income and civil liberties.
First consider income. We divided the countries into income quartiles based on GDP per capita. Specifically, we assigned all possible country pairs to cells based on their GDP per capita, as potential targets and potential origins. Thus, instead of a 159x159 matrix, our data are reduced to a 4x4 matrix. In each cell, we tallied the number of incidents perpetrated by people from a country in one income bracket against people from a country of another income bracket. For every entry, we normalized the counts by dividing by the geometric mean of the total population across countries in the two income brackets. Note that this differs subtly from our analysis in Table 5 and 6, where we weighted countries equally; here we weight countries by a combination of their size and their potential target's size. Conceptually, this formulation makes sense if the characteristics of the countries (in this case, income) are relevant, but the borders are not relevant. Mathematically, an entry in Table 7 , Pij, is given by:
where Cij is the number of incidents perpetrated by people from countries with an income level falling in quartile "i" against people in countries with income levels falling in quartile "j", and Ni and Nj represent the aggregate number of people (in millions) in the origin and target quartiles, respectively.
20 Table 8 provides the analogous matrix where the countries were cross-categorized into 3x3 cells based on their civil liberties index. That is, i refers to the civil liberties of the originating countries (low, medium and high) and j refers to the civil liberties available in the target countries (low, medium and high). Again, we pool all countries that fall in the same civil liberties category, and normalize by the geometric mean of the total population in each category.
Despite the (somewhat) different weighting and the added feature of crossclassification, the results are similar to what we observed from Table 6 . Terrorists from most countries are particularly likely to strike at others in countries with about the same income level, because a large number of the attacks target individuals in the country of origin. For this reason, the diagonals of Figure 7 have large entries. But terrorists who do not strike against targets in their own income brackets are much more likely to strike against targets from higher-income countries than from lower-income countries. Indeed, for terrorists from countries in the middle-income quartiles, targets in the highest-income quartile are more likely to be affected by their terrorist acts than are targets from countries in their own income quartile.
Countries with a high degree of civil liberties are unlikely to be origin countries for terrorist acts. The lower-and (especially) middle-level countries in terms of civil liberties are more likely to be origin countries for terrorism. Compared to Table 5 , the increase in source countries from those with a middle-level of civil liberties is a result of the new aggregation (by countries within a civil-liberties category) and the different scaling. Interestingly, countries with a high level of civil liberties appear to be somewhat more likely a target in these tabulations.
V. Conclusion
Nearly six months after he articulated a naïve economic explanation for terrorism and on the first anniversary of the al-Qa'ida attacks on American soil, President Bush The most salient patterns in the data on global terrorism that we presented suggest that, at the country level, the sources of international terrorism have more to do with repression than with poverty. The regression analysis showed that neither country GDP nor illiteracy is a good predictor of terrorist origins. Past work suggests that at the individual level, higher economic and social status lead to greater identification with terrorist goals. Therefore, the well-to-do represent a fount of supply. On the demand side, organizations (especially for attacks that require planning and coordination, with low chances for defection) will want to recruit disciplined cadres who will more likely succeed. Thus terrorist perpetrators are not necessarily poor. But those who are repressed politically tend to terrorize the rich, giving international terrorist events the feel of economic warfare.
Suicide attacks reveal much less on the interstate level. To be sure, in ten of the twenty-three cases where the targets were of a different country than the perpetrators, the targets were Americans, suggesting that when they do go international, suicide attackers go after the rich and the powerful. (India is the only target country suffering from an international suicide attack with a GDP/cap lower than the median, and this was a direct assault on its Prime Minister). To the extent that we can eke out patterns from the marginals (where perpetrator and target are different) in the suicide dataset, we see as with international terrorism, the origins are more likely to be in countries that deny civil liberties as compared to targets.
Several extensions of this research merit consideration. First, we need to dock the suicide data with that of international terrorism to have a general terrorism dataset. We then can construct a 150 x 150 matrix by country of origin and target, yielding a much more precise picture of who terrorizes whom. We plan as well to link our findings with systematic data on countries that sponsor and/or harbor terrorist organizations. Finally, we have noted a relationship of political "occupation" and being a target for terrorist attacks. This relationship merits further scrutiny.
To sum up, our data analysis up till now confirms the lesson that President Bush has already learned, namely that the economic foundations of terrorism are at best only indirect. More specifically, we have shown that on the margin, the kto are those who are politically repressed and the kogo are those who are wealthy. The kto is political; the kogo economic. India (227) Colombia (97) Yemen (49) Angola (41) Israel (30) Israel (100) Sri Lanka (75) Lebanon (30) Turkey (13) Saudi Arabia (8) Note: 7% of events targeted international institutions.
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